I’ve been interested in the question of whether there is a specific kind of phenomenal character associated with thinking or cognitive episodes, an issue that has raised much discussion in the last years in the philosophy of mind literature. In particular, I’m interested in exploring the following questions:
- How does phenomenal character relate to episodes of conscious thinking?
- Which kind of argument support cognitive phenomenology and which don’t?
- What kinds of consciousness should be distinguished for thought?
- What is the relation between cognitive attitudes and cognitive content with phenomenal character?
- What are the main similarities and differences between cognitive experience and perceptual experience?
- How does the temporal structure of cognitive episode relate to their being phenomenally conscious and part of the stream of consciousness?
- Can phenomenal character ground thought content?
- Does cognitive phenomenology play any rational (or other) role in our mental lives?
One way to approach the relation between thought and language (a huge topic) is to explore the connection between conscious thought and inner speech, or the “talking to ourselves silently“. I’ve been working on the following questions regarding inner speech:
- What is exactly inner speech and which elements should be distinguished in those episodes?
- What is the relation between conscious thought and inner speech?
- Which theories of inner speech are more adequate in relation to the cognitive phenomenology discussion?
- What is the relation between inner speech and unsymbolized thinking (episodes of thinking without neither words nor images)?
- Does inner speech play any role in self-knowlegde?
I’ve also been interested in the theoretical and conceptual aspects of intersectionality research. Intersectionality refers to the theory or framework that tries to account for the complex interaction of different social categories such as gender, race, sexuality, class, age, ability, etc., as they function in our everyday experiences giving raise to different patterns of oppression and privilege. I’m interested in exploring the following questions:
- What are the main conceptual questions raised by intersectionality studies?
- What is the relation among social categories (if any in particular)? What does it mean to say, as many authors do, that the relation between categories is that of ‘mutual constitution’?
- Is there an adequate metaphor for intersectionality?
- Which different levels of social reality should be distinguished and which are the relations among them regarding the functioning of intersectionality?
- How should we describe and explain experiences of oppression and privilege from an intersectional perspective?